Defence Procurement – Maritime Helicopter Project – Updated to July 2004 Politics, Procurement Practices, and Procrastination: the Quarter-Century Sea King Helicopter Replacement Saga Stephen Priestley, CASR Researcher [ Update: This In Detail article was first published in June 2003. A decade later, the CH-124 Sea King maritime helicopter is still in service. In 2004, the CH-148 Cyclone was chosen as a replacement. However, it is anyone's guess as to when operational Cyclones will be available to replace the clapped-out CF Sea Kings. How have we arrived at this sorry state of affairs? Peter MacKay, the current MND has described the Maritime Helicopter Project the "worst procurement" effort in Canadian history. In hopes of detecting root causes for maladies of that Maritime Helicopter Project procurement, this article traces the origins of the project and the decisions made by both DND and the various governing parties beginning a staggering 36 years ago.] Part 3 – "Slide!" or Canadian Forces Air Staff listens to their 'Power Animal' When the Canadian Armed Forces were unified in 1968, the 'air element' found itself operating disparate helicopter types having inherited Sea Kings from the Navy 
and twin-rotored Boeing-Vertol CH-113As from the Army. Both aircraft types were aging and the Air Force was presented with the unpalatable options faced by all other operators
of these helicopters. Option number one was to place 'follow-on' orders [1] for additional CH-124s and CH-113s, allowing for the inevitable attrition as well as the reduction of
flight hours that comes with aging airframes requiring increased maintenance. Option number two was to rationalize the helicopter fleet, replacing both existing types with a single new model.
Such an aircraft would have to be able to perform both the CH-124's ASW role and the CH-113's aerial search-and-rescue missions.Predictably, the Air Force didn't move on either option in 1978. As always, other procurement plans had priority – at the time, new fighters and long-range patrol aircraft. And, perhaps, Air Force planners believed that they had time to spare for replacing those aging helicopters. Whatever the reason, the proposed Sea King replacement remained a distinct project and was given a rather low priority. After all, hadn't the entire CH-124 fleet just been through a thorough structural rebuild and been re-fitted with the latest in Canadian ASW equipment. What's the rush? 
After 6 years of studies, DND began issuing contracts[1] for the 'Sea King Replacement Project' in 1983. These contracts were not for new shipboard helicopters despite the looming 20th
birthdays of the Sea Kings. Instead, DND would spend $50M developing avionics – mostly ASW-related gear – for a new helicopter type as yet unidentified. This approach may
seem back-to-front but, planners knew that developing first- rate ASW kit would take time. And at the time, Canada had a justifiable reputation as a world leader in ASW technology. Both Canada's
Navy and its defence industry wanted to maintain that reputation. What DND couldn't anticipate was just how rapidly the state-of-the-art would change for all electronic equipment –
including anti-submarine warfare gear – in the coming computer age.[1] These contracts were issued by Jean-Jacques Blais, the Minister of National Defence in the dying days of the last Trudeau government. In 1999, Blais became a paid lobbyist for MHP contender Thomson Marconi (now Thales Underwater). Next in this In Detail series > Part 4 – The New Shipboard Aircraft (NSA) Project CASR | In Detail | MHP Series Index | CH-124 Sea King | CH-148 Cyclone |