Defence Procurement – Maritime Helicopter Project – Updated to July 2004 Politics, Procurement Practices, and Procrastination: the Quarter-Century Sea King Helicopter Replacement Saga Stephen Priestley, CASR Researcher [ Update: This In Detail article was first published in June 2003. A decade later, the CH-124 Sea King maritime helicopter is still in service – indeed, DND is hunting for Sea King spare parts and RCN ships converted to accommodate the larger planned replacement helicopters had to be 'de-converted' at great expense to take on CH-124 shipboard aircraft once more. The Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone meant to satisfy DND's Maritime Helicopter Project was due in 2008 but its protoype had not even flown by then. A 'CH-148' was delivered in May 2011 but this ground-training helicopter was owned by Sikorsky and returned to the US a year later. That pattern has continued. Partially-equipped 'Interim Maritime Helicopters' began arriving in 2012 but, as with that 2011 'interim' IMH, these helicopters belong to Sikorsky and are only employed as ground training aids. It is anyone's guess as to when fully-operational Cyclones will be available to replace the clapped-out Sea Kings. Blame for the farce that MHP has become will be shifted from government to manufacturer to DND but the dates say it all. It is now 36 years since DND launched its Sea King Replacement Project, 28 years since SKR was rebranded as the New Shipboard Aircraft Project, 20 years since NSA was cancelled, and 10 years since the 'call for tenders' on the MHP was made. Sikorsky claims that 'fully compliant' CH-148s will arrive in 2013. We will see.] Part 1 – DND's Maritime Helicopter Project in the Current Political Landscape 
The long-delayed MHP (Maritime Helicopter Project) to find a replacement for the CH-124 Sea King shipboard aircraft seems, finally, to be reaching its conclusion. When this article was first
written, this Project was back in the news. A letter from Joe Volpe, then a Liberal back-bencher, caused the stir. At issue was the government's "lowest cost compliant" bidding rules.[1]
Replacing Sea Kings has always been a highly political issue, but it had also become highly personal.Joe Volpe was an active Paul Martin supporter. And, it would be idle to suggest that the MHP was not personally vexing (and politically dangerous) for the Prime Minister of the day, Jean Chrétien. Whatever Volpe intended with that letter, his message to Liberals was clear: the Sea King had become a major political liability. Jean Chrétien had allowed the MHP process to become drawn-out, embarassing, and expensive. But, Volpe hinted, things would be put right under a Paul Martin government. And, perhaps they will. One of Martin's first acts as Prime Minister was a widespread spending freeze. But, the MHP was among the rare exceptions. 
On 17 Dec. 2003, then-Defence Minister David Pratt issued a call for tenders for 28 new maritime helicopters (estimated at costing $3 Billion). Incentives are to be included to fast-track
these new helicopters (similar 'carrots' had already been put in place by John McCallum and Ralph Goodale, then Minister for Public Works). Despite the incentives, the first shipboard helicopter
from this order won't be operational until mid-2008. The rest of the order will be filled at a rate of one chopper per month. In other words, the CF's clapped-out Sea Kings must continue to
serve until they can be completely replaced by these new helicopters (of whichever type wins the Maritime Helicopter Project) around 2010 (some say 2012 – the MHP contest stalled once
again when Paul Martin dropped the writ).Unfortunately, as most Canadians know, the decrepit Sea Kings now crash with depressing regularity. How did we arrive at this sad state of affairs? In his paper for the Canadian Forces College, Col BW Akitt described the Maritime Helicopter Project as a "lesson in failed civil-military relations". And, such statements from insiders tend to be accepted without question. After all, these politicians aren't experts – it must be their fault. What might get lost in the shuffle, however, is the degree to which the Department of National Defence's approach to planning and procurement may also bear responsibility for this dragged-out 25-year process. We should seize the opportunity to review the history of decision-making behind the Maritime Helicopter Project to see what might be gleaned for use in the future. [1] This was not the first time "lowest cost compliant" bidding rules had been an issue. Team Cormorant (who then-Minister of National Defence John McCallum would imply was connected with the Volpe letter) had already complained to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal that such rules unfairly penalized their bid. Next in this In Detail Overview > Part 2 — the Sea King Replacement Project CASR | In Detail | MHP Series Index | CH-124 Sea King | CH-148 Cyclone |