CCV Armoured Vehicles – Tactical Requirements – October 2009
CCV: Close Combat Vehicle — Details of Tactical Requirements
David Pugliese has published more requirements for the Close Combat Vehicle project. These begin by describing the
"deficiencies" of current light armoured vehicles which led to the CCV project. These LAVs are subjected
to greater anti-armour threats than anticipated, are deployed for greater durations than expected, and, as a
result of over- loading by add-on armour kits, vehicle performance and durability are both degraded.
CASR comments follow CCV details published by
David Pugliese reproduced below:
What the Canadian Army is looking for in its Close Combat Vehicle [ CCV ]
The identified deficiencies that led to this project are:
Deployed troops are progressively exposed to more severe anti-armour threats.
Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs) are extensively employed on operations, some of
exceed what they were designed for.
Add-on protection kits have exceeded LAV designed GVW [Gross Vehicle Weight]
resulting in degraded agility, manoeuvrability, and reliability.
The overall deficiency can be stated as a lack of capacity to operate in the 'Medium
Armoured Vehicle' [MAV] class range to fill the current capability gap between the
LAV [ ie: Bison, Coyote, and LAV IIIs] and Leopard 2 [
Main Battle Tank ] fleets.
Aim of CCV Project:
To field a Medium Weight (30-45t) highly Protected and Mobile Close
Vehicle (CCV) in which fully-equipped Infantry and Forward Artillery
parties will be delivered intact for close combat operations, in medium to high
environments, often with the intimate support of Main Battle Tanks [MBT].
A single (24 hrs), sequential and generic tactical mission is defined as the following:
150km of travel on primary/secondary roads, trails, and offroads, at various speeds,
Shallow ford 3 times.
Ascend/Descend steep grades 5 times.
Section Dismount and Remount.
Stop, Shut-Down, and Re-Start on gradient.
Essential Automotive & Turret systems on for 20hrs.
Essential Communication/Navigation systems on for 24hrs.
Fire 200 main armament rounds and 1100 coax MG rounds.
Onboard consumption of three (3) meals and water.
[Initial Operational Capability] Eight supportable CCV planned for December 2012.
Full Operational Capability (FOC) – Planned for 2015.
Update: David Pugliese has now confirmed the source for the CCV
requirements and it was indeed a part of an official briefing to industry by the Project Management Office.
The introduction is odd in describing the
"deficiencies" of the current CF LAV fleets as a rationale for this CCV project. The deficiencies are summed up as LAVs
not being MAVs (Medium Armoured Vehicle). But such 'universal negatives' add nothing to our understanding of
the CCV requirements. Nor were weight classes arrived at arbitrarily.
The term 'light armoured vehicle' was highly fashionable in the 1990s but LAV covered a broad range of armour
varying from 5 to 20 tons. That rating covered the CF's AVGP (10.7 t) and Bison (13-14 t) but the
LAV III (17.2 t) pushed the upper end of that 'LAV' weight category. By the time CF LAV IIIs were fully
uparmoured and equipped to meet Kandahar conditions, this formerly light vehicle was nudging the 20 tonne MAV
In DND's 08 July 2009 Backgrounder on the CCV, medium
weight class  is adjusted upwards to start at 25 tonnes with the CCV "coming in between 25 and 45 tonnes". US
Army research had shown that armoured vehicles hit an off-road mobility 'break-point' at 20 tons. Above that weight,
wheeled vehicle performance was eclipsed by tracks. In other words, the CCV's weight range all but dictates
a tracked vehicle. Listing LAV "deficiencies" smacks of squabbling between rival NDHQ project
In reality, DND purchased one class of vehicle only to have field experience show that another weight class of armour
was required to fill the role of Infantry Fighting Vehicle (the class that both LAV IIIs and CCVs fall within) when
exposed to powerful roadside IEDs. Left unsaid is that, in different conditions, the LAV III's lighter weight and
lower impact (psychologically and on infrastructure) is both required and highly desirable. It is not a question of
the greater desirability of medium versus light so much as 'horses for courses'. In the current
deployment, LAV IIIs are falling short. And there's the rub.
The Close Combat Vehicle is not being purchased for the Afghan deployment. Current government policy is that active
Canadian Forces combat participation in Afghanistan wind down between July and December 2011. It will be another
full year before the first CCVs arrive (Initial Operational Capability, Dec 2012), with the fleet fully operational
in 2015. DND is ' planning for the next war '. Necessary, but why not be upfront about it ?
The next question is: What do these CCV tactical requirement details reveal to citizens about the direction of the
CCV Project Management Office? Ammunition requirements are perhaps most revealing. This and other details will be
covered in CASR In
 Those weight classes were reinforced by US Army studies that led to the adoption of Strykers (after the
loan of 32 Canadian LAV IIIs). In planning for the 21st Century, most armies (including Canada's) chose
LAVs in the 13-to-18 tonne range. But the US Army was examining 20-25 t "medium weight class" vehicles
for the then-coming FCS.
 These 1998-2000 studies by the US Army Corps of Engineers did acknowledge that major mobility advances were being
made. So, a 25 t LAV-H MAV cannot be ruled out.